Comment by rwmj
1 year ago
So they're removing PGP signatures, which certainly have some issues, and replacing them with ... nothing?
1 year ago
So they're removing PGP signatures, which certainly have some issues, and replacing them with ... nothing?
The research article cited in the announcement is titled "PGP signatures on PyPI: worse than useless."
That's the issue. Pretending there is a security solution in place is worse than being upfront that there is none. If you look down and notice that your seatbelt is actually made out of angel hair pasta, you might drive more carefully. Hopefully you'll also get a better car.
But they're not "worse than useless", that article was wrong. PGP/GPG are without doubt problematic, they have weak points (like use of SHA-1, some keys that could not be located, and terrible UI) but they are not worse than having no traceability of the package at all between the author and PyPI.
The system guaranteed that a key signed a package. That was its entire utility.
At best, it defeated plausible deniability for package maintainers who had avowed public keys, but then somehow signed a bad package. This wouldn't have stopped the malware from getting onto your system. It only would have led you to the hapless (but honest) package maintainer.
It didn't stop someone who is not you from generating a PGP key for Richard WM Jones, signing malware, uploading to PyPi, and then disappearing back under the rock where they live. And if you believe this system is not useless, then you also believe that at least one person out there was not dissuaded from installing that malware because "Hey, someone named Richard WM Jones went through the trouble of signing it!"
As is often the case, the value of this system depends on your threat model. I'm not too worried about someone going rogue from the tiny population of people who were using PGP correctly. But I am worried about using a platform that claimed to have signing infrastructure, when that infrastructure had no meaningful checks on who was signing.
> they are not worse than having no traceability of the package at all between the author and PyPI.
Except that they are: PGP does not give you this kind of identity relationship. The most it can give you is an association to a key ID, which is (1) brute-forceable, and (2) not strongly bound to any actual user or machine identity.
The only thing worse than an unsecured scheme is an insecure scheme that lulls users into a false sense of security and authenticity. PGP signatures on PyPI are the latter.
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It's like the larger holy war against self-signed certificates in TLS. They are strictly better than plaintext but there is software that will prefer a plaintext connection to self-signed TLS.
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I think another thing with pgp is that it's in this awkward place where it's bad enough that few people use it, but good enough that it prevents someone from making an alternative.
Nobody's making a PGP alternative because a major part of what makes PGP bad is that it tries to be a generic solution to every problem, when in practice signing and encryption workflows are incredibly domain-specific.
People are continuously creating better tools for domains that historically saw PGP usage. To name a few: Signal for short-form messaging, age for file encryption, signify/minisign for artifact signing.
The article is closer to a blog post than a multiple authors peer reviewed research paper published in a high impact journal.
That's because it is a blog post. It isn't advertised as anything else.
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Inasmuch as PGP signatures are rarely used and even more rarely useful, I don't think it's a problem to remove them and replace them with nothing. If it is a problem, it's been a problem for a long time and it's not really making the situation meaningfully worse to remove them.
That said, if PGP signatures are to be replaced then there's no reason why they can't be removed now and replaced with something later.
Sooner or later they will ask a photo of a passport… google's idea, from their security blog.
PGP signatures purpose is to remove the dependency on trusting PyPI, i.e. protecting against PyPI getting hacked.
(Note: PyPI protects against MITM with HTTPS.)
Removing this is predicated on the idea that is a low priority threat vector.